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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 43, NO. 1

EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES BEFORE
BRINGING FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS:
A REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. CODE SECTION 2254
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many instances in which a state's prisoner, after
being denied his liberty for years, has subsequently, upon issuance
of federal writ of habeas corpus, either been proven innocent or
adjudged entitled to a new trial upon grounds that he was denied
some constitutional right during the process of his state court
trial.' In some of these cases it has been clear from the very
beginning that if the allegations of the writ were proven, the detention was unconstitutional. Yet the prisoner is still forced to
endure years of confinement while exhausting state remedies before
2
federal habeas corpus is available to him.
The purpose here is to review the history of the federal writ
of habeas corpus as presently embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 3 and to4
discuss the proper application to be given to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
which in certain instances, requires exhaustion of state remedies
before habeas corpus may be brought in the federal courts.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The writ of habeas corpus historically has had as its basic
purpose the vindication of a prisoner's right to immediate liberty

I See, e.g., Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy For
State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461, 525-32 (1960) (article lists
an appendix and gives the history of 35 cases in which state prisoners
successfully utilized habeas corpus to set aside a state conviction).
2 E.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Daugharty v. Gladden, 257
F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1958); Pennsylvania ex rel. Woods v. Cavell, 254 F.2d
816 (3d Cir. 1958); Bovey v. Grandsinger, 253 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 929 (1958); Edwards v. Rhea, 238 F.2d 850 (6th Cir.
1956); Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 935 (1956); United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698
(2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1955); In re Carmen's Petition,
165 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Cal. 1958); United States ex rel. Montgomery v.
Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
3 [Hereinafter referred to as Section 2241] It is important to note that
§ 2241 is the basis of our present substantive habeas corpus law.
In the absence of some restriction imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958),
habeas corpus may be granted in all cases enumerated in this section.
4 [Hereinafter referred to as Section 2254]
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whenever wrongfully detained. Unlike the states' appellate procedure, to which the federal courts give deference as to a matter
of right and law, the writ of habeas corpus has always been regarded as a summary remedy, individual and distinct in its own
right. The forbearance which the federal courts exercise in granting
habeas corpus can be based on nothing higher than comity, and even
then comity based solely on accord with the results achieved by
the state courts in protecting federal rights.6
There is nothing in the language of the Federal Habeas Corpus
Statute, 7 which has remained substantially unchanged since 1867,8
to suggest that federal habeas corpus is in any way connected with,
or part of, the appeal procedure provided by the state courts. Indeed, the fact that the privilege of habeas corpus was extended to
prisoners in custody under state authority for the first time in 1867,
one year before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, should
indicate that Congress intended to provide a summary process
against state officials to more effectively preserve federal rights
than the state courts' process had done in the past. That federal
habeas corpus is an exceptional remedy, distinct and separate from
the appeal procedures provided by the state is further evidenced
9
by the fact that res judicata does not apply to habeas corpus.
In view of the basic differences in the nature of the two
remedies,10 it is unjustifiable to impose upon habeas corpus the

5See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 203-14 (1950) for an excellent summary of the history of the writ of habeas corpus. Reitz, Federal Habeas
Corpus: Impact Of An Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. REv.
1315, 1342-45 (1961).
OCovell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 182 (1884) (points out the distinction
between the appeal process of the states and habeas corpus).
728 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958).
8
Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of FederalHabeas Corpus,
61 HAv. L. Ruv. 657, 659 (1948).
9 Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924).
10 The purpose of the exhaustion of state remedies requirement as applied
to the states' appeal process is to assure that the federal courts do not
interfere with the normal process of state law, and that all constitutional questions raised in the state courts shall be properly matured
therein before they reach the federal courts on appeal. See Staub v.
City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958). In addition, as a matter of law
in ordinary cases involving the constitutionality of state law, the state
has not legally acted until its procedures are exhausted.
None of the above justifications for the exhaustion requirement,
however, apply to the remedy of federal habeas corpus. It is summary
from its very naure, for if the prisoner meets the requirements of the
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same exhaustion of state remedies requirements that serve an
effective purpose when applied to state appeal procedures.
However, it is unquestioned that the writ of habeas corpus,
as applied in some instances, has not effectively vindicated violations
of federal rights." In certain cases the broad application given
federal habeas corpus by the substantive requirements of Section
2241 has been limited, for all practical purposes, only to use as an
alternative to Supreme Court review, serving merely as a collateral12
attack procedure to set aside a final judgment of the state courts.
It is clear, however, that the enactment of Section 2254, the federal
statute dealing with exhaustion of state remedies before bringing
federal habeas corpus should not, in itself, be the basis for sub3
verting the purpose of the writ.1
Section 2254 states: 14
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either
an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of
circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner.
The revisor's notes state that this section was meant only
to be declaratory of existing decisions as affirmed by the Supreme

habeas corpus statute, he has an immediate right to be free from
restraint by state officials.
1"Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959). The petitioner in this case was
denied federal habeas corpus after a failure to perfect an appeal.
Petitioner had escaped from custody and, because of this, the lawyer's
motion for a new trial was denied and the appeal thereby lost.
In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), defendant's counsel filed
the papers for appeal one day late because, upon a failure to locate
anyone in the state office by telephone, he chose to deliver them in
person the next day instead of mailing them that same day. It was
unquestioned that the attorney did not deliberately flout the state
procedure. Because of this slight technical default, however, the
prisoner, who had received the death penalty, was denied habeas
corpus by the federal courts. The inadvertent loss of the state forum,
even when it was clear that a constitutional right had been violated,
resulted in the denial of federal habeas corpus.
Certainly such results are inconsistent with the concept of habeas
corpus as a remedy to vindicate constitutional rights whenever violated.
12 Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959); Hart, Forward: The Time Chart of
the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84, 118-19 (1959).
13 Hart, supra note 12, at 112-14.
14 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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Court, 15 specifically citing Ex parte Hawk,16 a 1944 case, as the
statute's source. The cases up to and including Hawk thus shed
much light upon what was intended by the statute. It is unquestioned that the cases beginning with Ex parte Royall,17 the
decision first cited for the general proposition that state judicial
remedies must be exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus will
be granted, and subsequent cases extending through and from Hawk,
all describe only what should ordinarily be proper procedure in
the state courts before bringing habeas corpus in the federal courts.
These cases recognize that much cannot be foreseen in laying down
a general rule, and that special circumstances justify departure
from a rule designed to regulate the usual case.' 8 In fact, within
a few years after the announcement of the exhaustion requirement
in Royall, cases were decided which held there was no duty to
exhaust state remedies before seeking habeas corpus. 19 Such cases
continued to be decided after Hawk and after the passage of Sec2
tion 2254.20 These cases and the words of the habeas corpus statute 1
plainly show federal courts are free to grant habeas corpus immediately, without state remedies being exhausted where: (1) a
person is held in state custody before a state judgment has been
rendered; 22 (2) there is an absence of available state court corrective process; 23 or (3) there are circumstances rendering such proc24
ess ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
15 H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1947); Final Revisor's Notes
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958). See also S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1948); Hearings on H.R. 3214 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1948).
16 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
'7 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
Is See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 210 (1950).
19 E.g., In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890); Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
20
E.g., United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd,
372 U.S. 391 (1963); Robbins v. Green, 218 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1954);
United States ex rel. DeVita v. McCorkle, 216 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1954).
21 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
22 Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890);
United States ex Tel. Flynn v. Fuellhart, 106 Fed. 911 (W.D. Pa. 1901).
23
Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Williams v.
Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938);
United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 372
U.S. 391 (1963); United States ex rel. Martin v. Walker, 203 F.2d 563
(2d Cir. 1953); Potter v. Dowd, 146 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1944); Yohyowan
v. Luce, 291 Fed. 425 (E.D. Wash. 1923); Pennsylvania ex rel. Woods v.
Cavell, 157 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Sawyer v. Duffy, 60 F. Supp.
852 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
24 United States ex rel. DeVita v. McCorkle, 216 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1954);
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Section 2254 does not apply to cases falling within the first
category listed above. In such cases the general rule of Section
2241 allows habeas corpus to be brought immediately. Cases fitting
under the second and third categories are provided for in the
exceptions contained within Section 2254 itself. In spite of these
statutory provisions, however, many cases still arise where exhaustion of state remedies is required
in spite of seemingly plain statu25
tory language to the contrary.
III. HABEAS CORPUS CASES TO WHICH SECTION
2254 IS WHOLLY INAPPLICABLE
The exhaustion of remedies requirement of Section 2254 does
not limit the general rule of Section 2241 in all cases. By its very
terms it applies only to "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court." Thus, persons who meet the substantive
requirements for bringing habeas corpus,2 6 and who are in custody,
but have not yet had a state judgment rendered against them, have
no statutory duty to exhaust state remedies before applying for
federal habeas corpus. The revisor's notes to Section 2254 clearly
point this out. 27 The reason is that if Section 2254 were applied to
applications for habeas corpus by persons detained solely under
authority of a state officer it would unduly hamper federal courts
in the protection of federal officers detained for acts committed
in the course of official duty.28 It is clear, however, that private
Brown v. Frisbie, 178 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1949); Boyd v. O'Grady, 121
F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1941); Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.
1931); United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973 (N.D.
Ill. 1944).
25
Because of the usual attitude that § 2254 is "the rule" this may be
difficult to conceptualize. The general habeas corpus rule is primarily
covered by 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958). By itself it would clearly provide
that habeas corpus is available to vindicate the listed federal rights
whenever violated. The application of this general rule is, however,
restricted by the exhaustion of remedies requirements codified in § 2254.
The restrictions placed upon the general rule by § 2254 are themselves
limited, however, by the two exceptions within § 2254 itself.
20 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958). Note particularly the broad terms of subsection
(c), which state that habeas corpus is available to a prisoner who
"(1) is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States
or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or (2) . . . is in
custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress,
or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the
United States; or (3) ... is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States . ..

."

27 S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1948).
28 Ibid.
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citizens as well as federal officials need not exhaust
state remedies
29
when they are detained prior to a state judgment.
Section 2254 was undoubtedly made inapplicable to persons in
custody, but not pursuant to a judgment, in order to preserve the
immediate right to bring habeas corpus in situations such as that
presented'in the landmark case of In re Neagle.30 In Neagle, a
United States Marshal was removed from state custody before
judgment. The court recognized that the federal government had
an important interest in the performance of its governmental functions, and that its officials who were acting pursuant to federal
law could not constitutionally be held by state authorities.3 1 It was
pointed out that so long as the federal official was acting pursuant
to federal law,32 the supremacy clause of the 33Constitution would
compel his immediate release by habeas corpus.
basis for making a distinction in habeas corpus petitions brought
before a judgment and those after a judgment is that there may possibly

29The

be a justifiable presumption that custody pursuant to a court's judgment
is constitutional. There can be no such presumption before a judgment

has been rendered, however.

30 See 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
31Id. at 75. The Court reasoned: "[I]f the prisoner is held in the state
court to answer for an act which he was authorized to do by the law of
the United States, which it was his duty to do as marshal of the United
States, and if in doing that act he did no more than what was necessary
and proper for him to do, he cannot be guilty of a crime under the law
of the State of California. When these things are shown it is established
that he is innocent of any crime against the laws of the State, or of any
other authority, whatever. There is no occasion for any further trial in
the state court, or in any court. The Circuit .Court of the United States
was as competent to ascertain these facts as any other tribunal ...
It is the exercise of a power common under all systems of criminal
jurisprudence."
32
Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900) (revenue officer); Ohio v.
Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899) (governor of soldiers' home); Ex parte
Dierks, 55 F.2d 371 (D. Colo. 1932); Ex parte Warner, 21 F.2d 542 (N.D.
Okla. 1927) (prohibition agent); Ex parte Willman, 277 Fed. 819 (S.D.
Ohio 1921) (postal employee); Ex parte Beach, 259 Fed. 956 (S.D. Cal.
1919); Stegall v. Thurman, 175 Fed. 813 (N.D. Ga. 1910); United States
v. Lipsett, 156 Fed. 65 (W.D. Mich. 1907); In re Leaken, 137 Fed. 680
(S.D. Ga. 1905) (U.S. Dist. Attorney); West Virginia v. Laing, 133 Fed.
887 (4th Cir. 1904); In re Laing, 127 Fed. 213 (S.D. W. Va. 1903); In re
Turner, 119 Fed. 231 (S.D. Iowa 1902) (army officer); United States
ex rel. Flynn v. Fuellhart, 106 Fed. 911 (W.D. Pa. 1901) (secret service
agent); Campbell v. Waite, 88 Fed. 102 (8th Cir. 1898); In re Waite, 81
Fed. 359 (N.D. Iowa 1897); Kelly v. Georgia, 68 Fed. 652 (S.D. Ga.
1895); Ex parte Conway, 48 Fed. 77 (D. S.C. 1891); United States ex rel.
McSweeney v. Fullhart, 47 Fed. 802 (W.D. Pa. 1891); North Carolina v.
Kirkpatrick, 42 Fed. 689 (W.D. N.C. 1890).
33 135 U.S. 1, 63 (1890).
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Cases preceding the passage of Section 2254 had also extended
the doctrine of Neagle to private citizens acting pursuant to federal
law. These decisions indicate that it mattered not whether the
person detained was employed as a federal official, but rather
the important consideration was whether or not the detention of
the individual substantially interfered with an important right of
the federal government. 4 Wildenhus's Case,35 is an early example
of the federal interest which was deemed important enough to be
protected by allowing immediate habeas corpus. In that case state
authorities arrested a foreign ship's crew contrary to a treaty between the United States and the government of the ship's crew.
It was pointed out that the operation of the federal government
and its relationship with other governments was involved. It was
this federal interest, rather than the individual interests of the ship
and crew, which was determinative in allowing immediate habeas
corpus before judgment. 36 Similarly, many cases have arisen where
a state, by statute, has denied a private citizen his constitutional
right to carry on interstate commerce unencumbered by state interference. In re Beine37 and Ex parte Jervey,8 two typical examples,
discuss the clear constitutional right being denied the individual;
but in each instance the federal right to have interstate commerce
carried on without having a tax placed upon it by a state seems
to be emphasized over the purely individual right.
The individual's federal rights are, however, protected by
habeas corpus, and even without a showing that a wrongful detention of a private person substantially interferes with the operation
of the federal government. Under Section 2241 an individual is
entitled to immediate habeas corpus in the federal courts when he
is unconstitutionally held in state custody prior to a state judgment.

34

Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887); Ex parte Green, 114 Fed. 959
(WD. Ky. 1902); In re Beine, 42 Fed. 545 (D. Kan. 1890); Ex parte
Kieffer, 40 Fed. 399 (D. Kan. 1889); Ex parteJervey, 66 Fed. 957 (D. S.C.
1895); Ex parte Edwards, 37 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Fla. 1941).
35 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
86 Id. at 12, 18.
87 42 Fed. 545 (D. Kan. 1890).
88 66 Fed. 957 (D. S.C. 1895).
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IV. HABEAS CORPUS CASES TO WHICH SECTION 2254 APPLIES, BUT WHICH FALL WITHIN THE EXCEPTIONS
LISTED IN THE SECTION

A. EXCEPTION ONE-AN ABSENCE OF AVAILABLE STATE CoRREcTIVE
PROCESS

Even where a judgment has been rendered by a state court,
Section 2254 contains two exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies
requirement. The first provides for situations where there is an
absence of available state corrective process. It is now conceded
that a prisoner in custody pursuant to a state judgment, who for
some good reason did not,8 9 or was not able to avail himself of
the state's appellate procedure, 40 may obtain a hearing upon application for federal habeas corpus. Available state remedies are
now recognized as being only those which are presently available
to the specific prisoner seeking relief.41 Some courts which refused
to grant habeas corpus after a prisoner failed to take advantage
of the appellate procedure provided by the state, reasoned that the
prisoner, by his failure to appeal, had automatically waived his
right to resort to his federal writ of habeas corpus. This was held
to be the case even though the prisoner exerted every effort possible
in view of his limited education, finances, or intelligence. 42 Some
courts still reason that one who fails to avail himself of the appeal
procedure of the state should not be allowed to use habeas corpus
as a writ of error.4 Such reasoning results in placing the availability of federal habeas corpus, a remedy entirely separate from
appeal, 44 at the mercy of the state courts' procedure. It is one thing
to insist that a prisoner must follow state procedure to the letter
if he chooses to vindicate his constitutional rights by appeal from
the state courts, but it is another thing to say that when a prisoner
has made every reasonable effort to appeal and has failed, he
should be denied federal habeas corpus because of such failure. If

89 United States ex Tel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962), affd, 372

U.S. 391 (1963).
40 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
41 Cases cited note 23 supra.
42 Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
43
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S.
179 (1907); Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184 (1899); Baker v. Grice,
169 U.S. 284 (1898); Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231 (1895); In 'e

Frederich, 149 U.S. 70 (1893); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886);
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876).
44
Note, supra note 8.
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the denial of constitutional rights remains unremedied, habeas
corpus should still be available.
In Johnson v. Zerbst,45 however, the court took a different
approach in deciding whether a prisoner had automatically waived
his right to habeas corpus by failing to appeal. The court held that
habeas corpus was available to a prisoner who had not waived his
constitutional right to counsel, and who, because of lack of counsel,
had failed to perfect an appeal. The waiver theory, which probably
should have no application to habeas corpus cases whatsoever, 46
was, at least in Zerbst, confined to cases in which the prisoner consciously and willingly refused to take advantage of the appeal procedure which, as a practical matter, was available to him.47 Zerbst
recognized the obvious truth that one without counsel and ignorant
of legal procedure could not be expected to perfect an appeal.
Potter v. Dowd4s and Rhea v. Edwards49 allowed habeas corpus
after appeal time had run. In Potter, the prisoner was too poor
to employ an attorney. In Rhea, counsel had abandoned the case
while Rhea was in prison and had no knowledge that he was without a lawyer. In United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay,50 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit of New York took a big step toward
restricting the application of the waiver doctrine to habeas corpus.
The prisoner in Fay failed to appeal for fear that upon appeal he
might again lose and be sentenced to death rather than life imprisonment which he was serving. Two other prisoners convicted
on the same charge, however, did appeal and their convictions were
reversed on the grounds that evidence was unconstitutionally
admitted against them. In deciding the issue of whether the prisoner
had waived his right to habeas corpus by failing to appeal, the court
gave heavy consideration to the obviously violated constitutional
right and the great probability that the prisoner would be freed
entirely upon retrial, if any were even held. The court stated,

45304 U.S. 458 (1938).
46
Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948); Central Union Tel. Co. v. City of
Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190 (1925). Note in each of these cases that
the waiver spoken of is a waiver of the right to continued use of the
state forum for the process of appeal. See Reitz, supra note 5, at 1332-38
for a discussion of the inapplicability of this waiver doctrine to habeas
corpus.
47
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
48 146 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1944).
49 136 F. Supp. 671 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
50300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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"We cannot believe that Noia [the prisoner] would consciously and
willingly have surrendered his constitutional right had he known
then what he knows now ....51
The Supreme Court, in the recent landmark case of Fay v.
Noia,52 affirmed the circuit court decision in United States ex rel.
Noia v. Fay on the waiver issue. The Supreme Court made it clear
that slight procedural defaults in the state courts, if not made willfully, would not preclude the prisoner from habeas corpus. Fay
established that the federal courts had the power to grant habeas
constitutional
corpus whenever the prisoner had no remedy for his
5 3
rights presently available to him in the state courts.
This case should herald an entirely different approach to federal
habeas corpus than the state courts have presently been taking.
In reciting a complete history of the federal writ,54 the Court made
it clear that the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus will not
be subdued in the future by the unrelated technicalities of state
appellate procedure.
Unless the seemingly clear language of Fay is substantially
emasculated in subsequent case development, it would appear that
constitutional rights are at last being put in their proper perspective
and assured immediate protection by habeas corpus.
B.

EXCEPTION Two-AN

EXISTENCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES

RENDERING

SUCH PROCESS INEFFECTIVE To PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE
PRISONER
This exception has been held to relieve a prisoner from the
burden of exhausting state remedies even when the process of the
state is presently available, if such process is not a practical remedty
to protect his rights.
In United States ex tel. DeVita v. McCorkle, 5 a state prisoner
had been sentenced to death and was in the process of exhausting
his state remedies by submitting a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court. 56 At the time he applied for the writ, a definite
51300 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir. 1962).
52
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.

55 216 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1954).
56
See Darr v.Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950). In overruling Wade v. Mayo,
334 U.S. 672 (1948), the Court held that an application for certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court was a link in the exhaustion of
state remedies. In the absence of exceptional circumstances it is a
prerequisite to bringing habeas corpus in a federal district court.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 43, NO. 1
date had not yet been established for his execution, but his counsel
reasonably expected that it would be the next day, before the
petition for certiorari could be perfected. The court granted the
writ of habeas corpus, stating that the petition for certiorari was
"process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner as is stated
'57
in the alternative clause of the governing statute.
Such results show that the federal courts are taking a realistic
look at the situation rather than merely looking to the record to
see if the prisoner has a paper remedy available. Clearly the
prisoner in McCorkle did have a paper remedy-his petition for
certiorari. It is equally clear that notwithstanding this remedy
his death would have deprived him permanently of whatever constitutional rights be had.
In Boyd v. O'Grady,5 8 a prisoner applied for a state writ of
habeas corpus after conviction, but did not appeal to the state
supreme court. The court of appeals discussed two considerations
which made this case exceptional so as to allow immediate release
on habeas corpus if the constitutional claim could be proven. First,
the court relied on the fact that in the past the state court had
consistently wrongly rejected similar claims. 59 Second, and perhaps
even more important in everyday application, the court pointed
out that the prisoner could not possibly preserve his rights even if
he ultimately would have been able to win on his claim in the state
courts, because by the time he obtained his relief his sentence would
have been served. 60 This is frank judicial recognition that one has
no legal remedy if it takes as long to attain the remedy as it does

57 216

F.2d 743, 744 (3d Cir. 1954).
(8th Cir. 1941).
59 Id.at 148. Note the realistic approach the court took in deciding whether
or not the petitioner had an adequate state remedy. The court considered the past results of the state court in similar cases in deciding
whether the petitioner should have been required to pursue a state
remedy. The court stated: "We think it must be inferred from the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Nebraska... [citing cases], and from
the state court's summary denial of the petition for habeas corpus in
this case, that at least up to the time of the decision in Smith v. O'Grady
in February of this year, the Nebraska courts when considering petitions
for habeas corpus did not give to the Nebraska statute requiring assignment of counsel to one accused of a penitentiary offense the same
effect as the federal courts are required to give to the assistance of
counsel clause of the Sixth Amendment in habeas corpus cases before
them. It is at best doubtful whether the Nebraska courts would ...
have granted habeas corpus ....
60
Id.at 148, 149.
58121 F.2d 146
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to serve the sentence. Via the delay and intervening imprisonment,
his constitutional rights have been permanently lost, just as the
prisoner's life in United States ex Tel. DeVita v. McCorkle would
have been permanently lost had he been limited to his state remedy.
Under the rationale of O'Grady, if the time element makes an
"available" remedy ineffective to protect the prisoner's rights, he
cannot be compelled to pursue it.
There are, of course, cases which allow a federal official immediate habeas corpus even when the official has not applied for
it until after he is in custody pursuant to judgment. 61 In such
cases, the urgency of vindicating the federal right combined with
the delay which would result if the official were restricted to use
of state process may operate to fit such case within exception two
of Section 2254 as constituting the existence of circumstances rendering the state process ineffective to protect the rights of the
prisoner.
It would seem that this urgent right to vindication of federal
rights should produce many more exceptional cases than are now
appearing. It would be inconsistent for the courts to hold that it is a
case of particular urgency when the protection of a Supreme Court
Justice is involved, and not likewise hold the case to be exceptional
when the very law which the Justices are appointed to uphold is
flouted. Certainly every individual has a right and a duty to obey
federal law, and in that sense is, when detained while merely acting
pursuant to a valid law, answering for an act which he was authorized to do by the law of the United States, within the clear meaning
of In re Neagle.6 2 We are not without instances where states, by
wrongful detention of private citizens, have delayed the enforcement of federal laws, Supreme Court decisions, and Interstate
Commerce Comission orders. Cases in which Negroes are detained
by state authorities for frequenting public places under right of
federal statute or Supreme Court decisions,6 3 as well as cases in
which states have detained persons for riding interstate carriers
under similar right,64 are examples which should be exceptional.
In such cases a prisoner should be allowed to bring habeas corpus
immediately after judgment by the state court because of the
urgency of protecting the federal right involved.
61

E.g., Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899); In re Leaken, 137 Fed. 680
(S.D. Ga. 1905); In re Waite, 81 Fed. 359 (N.D. Iowa 1897).
62
See note 29 supra.
63
See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
6
4 See Wall Street Journal, May 31, 1961, p. 1, col. b.
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Any realistic approach to the problem of preserving constitutional rights must consider the time factor. One author who made
an analysis of thirty-five successful petitions for habeas corpus 65
noted that all the successful petitioners were convicted of very
serious offenses, most either receiving the death sentence or life
imprisonment. It was pointed out that the obvious reason for this
was that those who received lesser sentences had no practical chance
to avail themselves of habeas corpus. It evidently takes so long
under the present requirements of Section 2254 to mature a case
for federal habeas corpus that the "lighter" sentences of only a
few years are completed and the cases thereby become moot66 before
they can even receive a hearing. The time lapse between conviction
and obtaining relief by habeas corpus in one case studied was
twenty-six years.67 There were thirteen cases in which the time
span was ten years or more, and twenty-four in which it was five
years or more. Without the need of going into histrionics as to
the purpose of "The Great Writ," it certainly seems obvious that
it was never intended to protect only those sentenced to life imprisonment or other long terms.
In fact, such delays as occur should present serious constitutional problems. Article I, section 9, clause two, in limiting the
powers of Congress, provides: 6
"The privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." A federal
statute, which as a practical matter denies a state's prisoner the
right to even apply for habeas corpus until after a delay of years
would seem to suspend the privilege of the writ 69 and fall within

65 Reitz, supra note 1, at 484.

66 Jones v. Cunningham, 294 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1961); See Note, 48 VA. L.
REV. 112 (1962).
67 United States ex. tel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill.
1949). There is no indication that the prisoner sought relief prior to
1947 or 1948, however.
68 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
69 1 WATSON, THE CONSTrrTUTIoN OF THE UNMTED STATES 723 (1910). 'Every
one who is deprived of his liberty is entitled to attempt to regain it by
applying for a writ of habeas corpus. This is what is meant by the
privilege of the writ. It is the privilege one has to ask that a writ be
issued and the cause of his detention inquired into. This privilege
existed at common law, and was in the nature of a natural right. To
suspend the privilege of the writ is to prevent the writ from being
put into operation; in other words, to deprive persons of the benefit
[emphasis added] of the writ."
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the prohibition of this constitutional provision.70 It was always
assumed by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention that
the privilege of the writ was to be enjoyed "in the most expeditious
and ample manner."7' That a delay of years before being granted
such privilege does not accord with the intent of the founders of
the Constitution, should be obvious.
In addition to the time factor, practices in state prisons often
prevent prisoners from even applying for the writ of habeas
corpus. Such practices have been held to create circumstances
rendering the state process ineffective to protect the rights of the
prisoner within the meaning of Section 2254. United States ex rel.
Montgomery v. Ragen7 2 presented such a situation. The prisoner,
serving a sentence of 199 years, had neither successfully appealed
nor completed an application for a state writ of habeas corpus.
Upon the eventual receipt of a writ, however, it was established
that the warden of the Joliet, Illinois, prison had not permitted
prisoners to send petitions for writs to any court for a period of at
least two years. Although the court held against the petitioner on
the merits of his constitutional claim, it stated that the case presented the special circumstances spoken of in Section 2254 that
would excuse 7a3 failure to resort to the appeal procedure or other
state remedies.

7

o See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).

THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, pp. 341, 576
(1911). Farrand traces the progress of the various sections of the Constitution from introduction to final adoption, taking much of his history
from Madison's Journal. When Article I, section 9, clause two was
submitted to the convention by Pinckney it read: "The privileges and
benefit of the Writ of Habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this Government in the most expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be
suspended by the Legislature except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding
- months." As
reported in 1 Ms, THE CoNsTITuTIox Ao THE CouRTs 182 (1924),
"The Committee on Style made merely a verbal change, and then reported as follows:-'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety may require it.' " See generally, THE CoNsTTUTXON OF THE
UNITED STATES 275-81 (amended to Jan. 1, 1938), officially issued as
S. Doc. 232, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1938); PREscoTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 737, 738 (1941).
72 54 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ill. 1944).
7a Id.at 976.
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In Robbins v. Green,7 4 a case in which the prisoner was financially unable to perfect an appeal, the court could have relied upon
"the absence of available state corrective process" in granting
however, to rely on exception two, which
habeas corpus. It chose,
75
was equally applicable.
V. WHEN IS A CASE "EXCEPTIONAL" WITHIN THE MEANING
OF THE EXCEPTIONS OF SECTION 2254?
Upon an examination of the cases which have been held to be
"exceptional" under either exception one or two of Section 2254,
certain common characteristics are noticeable. Two or more of the
following factors are usually present: (1) There is a clear violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights; (2) The prisoner's
burden of vindicating his rights through use of state process is great
because of the time, energy, and expense involved; and (3) There
is a good probability that upon granting of the writ the prisoner
will be discharged entirely.
If at least the first two of the above considerations are present,
and as a practicalmatter considering all factors the prisoner has not
deliberately flouted the appeal procedure of the state and has no
remedy presently available to him or as a practicalmatter there is
an existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective
to protect his rights, he should be allowed an immediate hearing
upon aplication for habeas corpus.
Some argue, however, that the federal courts are already
overburdened with hearings and applications for habeas corpus and
should not be further crowded.7 6 It is true that many habeas
corpus petitions are being submitted to the federal courts. Between
1950 and 1960, 6,000 petitions were filed in the federal district
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218 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1954) (held that a financial barrier to perfecting
an appeal constituted circumstances rendering such process [i.e., a

theoretical right to review by the Supreme Judicial Court] ineffective
to protect the rights of the prisoner within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §

2254 (1958)).
exceptions within § 2254 itself are perhaps overlapping or interchangeable to some extent. As pointed out in the revisor's notes to
§ 2254, S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1948), the purpose of
exceptions one and two was to further elucidate what was meant by
an "adequate state remedy." This concept should be kept in mind to
avoid the error of making overly technical distinctions based on the
exact phrasing of each section.
76
See, e.g., Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 228 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
75 The
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courts. 77 This would indicate that even under the law as presently
applied, prisoners who are physically able to do so are not reluctant
to assert their judicial contentions even though they may be without
merit. The fact that is often overlooked, however, is that from
the 6,000 petitions submitted, a yearly average of only thirty-one

applications are given a hearing. The rest, being patently frivolous,
are dismissed upon first reading.78 There is no reason to believe
the burden would be greatly increased in the future unless the
states become completely heedless of their duties. The prisoner
who is able to bring immediate habeas corpus, even under a broad
application of Section 2254 would probably, in the great majority
of cases, still have had at least one trial at the state level, and
perhaps more. Generally, at least, a finding of fact will be needed
before it can be sufficiently clear that a constitutional right has been
violated. Yet, if somewhere during the course of exhausting his
state remedies the prisoner is able to show that his case falls within
one of the exceptions to Section 2254, what justification can there be
for denying him vindication of his constitutional right as soon as
possible? Certainly the fact that the federal courts may become
crowded is not a valid reason. Such a problem as this is better
solved by appointing more federal judges than by denying constitutional rights.
It is also argued that if federal influence is expanded into
the area the states have long felt to be a hallowed ground, it will
destroy the integrity of the state court system. If, however, by
preserving state integrity, a prisoner is deprived of his constitutional
rights, such "integrity" hardly seems worth preserving. The integrity of the states' procedure must be judged by whether or not
it dispenses justice as fairly and efficiently as possible. In some
states, because of the present inadequacies of due process protection
and collateral attack procedures, a prisoner is either completely
denied justice, or justice is substantially delayed.7 9 In addition,
many states limit their habeas corpus or other post-conviction
remedies to situations where the trial court had no jurisdiction over
the defendant, or over the crime charged, or where its sentence was
beyond the statutory limits of punishment.80 Any resulting embarSee Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State
Prisoners,108 U. PA. L. REv. 461, 478, 479 (1960).
78 Ibid.
79
Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in
Federalism,7 UTAn L. REV. 423, 441 (1961).
8
0 See Scott, One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure, 38 DicTA
65, 82-83 (1961).
77
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rassment from a federal court upset of a state conviction in such a
case is largely the state's own making.
VI. CONCLUSION
The historical purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to vindicate federal rights whenever violated. Even where a state prisoner
has chosen initially to rely on the state procedure, Section 2254
should not be applied in such a manner as to subvert the immediate
use of the writ. The only possible justification for the federal
courts' deference to a state's appellate procedure before allowing
use of the separate remedy of habeas corpus is the presumption that
the constitutional rights of the prisoner will be effectively preserved through utilization of the state process.
Such a presumption is usually justified when the prisoner is
in custody pursuant to a state judgment. But if the prisoner has
applied for federal habeas corpus before a state judgment has been
rendered, no such presumption exists and he is entitled to apply
for habeas corpus immediately.
If the prisoner is in custody pursuant to a judgment the state
courts should still, in most cases, continue to be the source of
justice for the state prisoner. But if an examination of all the
evidence indicates that the state process has failed or will fail
to protect the prisoner's constitutional rights the writ of habeas
corpus in the federal courts should always be available. When the
exceptional case arises in which, either at the very outset or during
the process of exhausting state remedies, it is obvious that on the
substantive merits, as distinguished from the procedural lapse, the
prisoner should not be imprisoned, and those merits are of constitutional magnitude, any explanation advanced to deny the prisoner
his vindication by habeas corpus when the state cannot provide
relief is very unconvincing. Procedure exists, or ought to exist,
for the purpose of effectuating rights, not denying them. To refuse
to deal with practical realities when basic rights such as liberty and
life itself are at stake is totally unjustified and unreasonable. If a
state remedy is adequate to protect a prisoner's rights within the
meaning of adequacy as spelled out under Section 2254, then clearly
no federal intervention through habeas corpus is needed or is desirable. But where, as a practical matter, the state remedies are not
adequate, their exhaustion is not necessary. Section 2254 clearly
provides for situations where no exhaustion of state remedies is
necessary, and the courts should no longer ignore its plain meaning.
Merritt James '64

